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Economists have recently revived the notion that recessions play a useful role in fostering
innovation and growth. But in practice, a major source of innovation, R&D, is procyclical.
In fact, R&D is procyclical even for ﬁrms that do not appear to be ﬁnancially constrained.
This paper argues the reason R&D is procyclical is because of a dynamic externality inherent
to R&D that makes entrepreneurs short-sighted and concentrate their innovation in booms
even though it is optimal to concentrate it in recessions. Thus, what previous authors have
argued is a desirable feature of ﬂuctuations in the previous literature — creating opportunities
for intertemporal substitution — turns out to be a social liability in equilibrium.
∗Ia mg r a t e f u lt oJ e ﬀ Campbell, Marty Eichenbaum, Huw Lloyd-Ellis, Kiminori Matsuyama, Alex Monge,
Joanne Roberts, and Fabrizio Zilibotti for their comments, as well as seminar participants at Northwestern, the
Stockholm School of Economics, Queens’ University, the Chicago Fed, the NBER, the Canadian Macro Study
Group, and the Society of Economic Dynamics.Introduction
In recent years, economists have revived the Schumpeterian idea that recessions promote various
activities that contribute to long-run productivity.1 Modern reincarnations of this hypothesis
emphasize the role of intertemporal substitution: since the opportunity cost of investing in
growth — the forgone output or sales that could have been obtained instead — is lower in
recessions, there is more incentive to undertake such activities in downturns. Recessions should
therefore stimulate long-run productivity growth, and cyclical ﬂuctuations may raise welfare by
allowing the economy to grow at a lower overall resource cost.
Although some growth-enhancing activities do appear to be countercyclical, one of the major
sources of long-run productivity growth — research and development (henceforth R&D) — is
clearly procyclical. That is, spending on R&D falls rather than rises in recessions, despite
the fact that R&D is relatively less costly in downturns. Griliches (1990) summarizes the
evidence for procyclical R&D activity. More recent work by Fatas (2000) reaﬃrms Griliches’
conclusions. Still more recently, Comin and Gertler (2004) ﬁnd that R&D is strongly procyclical
at frequencies of between 8 and 50 years, suggesting sustained low output growth is associated
with low R&D activity.
How can we reconcile this apparent conﬂict between theory and data? Is procyclical R&D
ineﬃcient, and if so is there a role for policy intervention? One hypothesis is that recessions
do not really create opportunities for intertemporal substitution, e.g. because R&D does not
use resources that could otherwise be used in production. Indeed, Aghion and Saint Paul
(1998) show that if productivity-improving activities use ﬁnal goods rather than factor inputs,
innovation will be procyclical.2 But Aghion and Saint Paul are also quick to dismiss this
explanation. As Griliches (1984) observes, the main input into R&D is labor, not produced
goods. Moreover, productivity in the goods sector is procyclical, even after correcting for
variable utilization as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) and Basu (1996), whereas
Griliches (1990) concludes productivity in the R&D sector (with patents as a proxy for output)
is acyclical. This suggests that the forgone output from employing resources in R&D is indeed
lower in recessions, and procyclical R&D may be socially ineﬃcient.
1See, for example, Hall (1991), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and Gomes, Greenwood, Rebelo (2001) on
the eﬀects of recessions on search; Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993), Aghion and Saint Paul (1998), and Canton
and Uhlig (1999) on the eﬀects of recessions on technical change; and DeJong and Ingram (2001), Dellas and
Sakellaris (2003), and Barlevy and Tsiddon (2004) on the eﬀects of recessions on human capital accumulation.
2Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), this is known as the lab-equipment model. Comin and Gertler
(2004) also assume R&D uses ﬁnal goods, and note that this assumption helps to generate procyclical R&D.
1So why would ﬁrms fail to concentrate R&D in recessions when it is relatively less costly? One
natural explanation is that ﬁrms are somehow constrained from doing so. For example, Aghion,
Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2005) argue that credit constraints may discourage ﬁrms from
undertaking growth-enhancing activities in recessions. In their model, the opportunity cost of
R&D is lower in recessions, but downturns also reduce the amount of internal funds that ﬁrms
can use to ﬁnance ongoing R&D projects. Aghion et al show that if ﬁrms had unlimited access
to credit, they would choose to concentrate growth-enhancing activities in recessions. But if
ﬁrms anticipate they will be constrained from borrowing, they may focus their R&D eﬀorts
in booms. This logic would suggest that facilitating borrowing in recessions should serve to
restore eﬃciently countercyclical R&D.
While credit constraints are undoubtedly responsible for part of the cyclical pattern in R&D,
there are reasons to suspect they cannot account for all of it. First, as I document below, R&D
remains procyclical even for ﬁrms that are relatively unconstrained. Second, other investments
in productivity that are just as vulnerable to credit constraints do not appear to be procyclical.
For example, Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) cite various studies that show ﬁrms concentrate
reorganization, retraining, and machine upgrading in periods of weak demand. Since these
activities can be just as costly as R&D, binding credit constraints would presumably lead these
activities to also turn procyclical, a point Aghion et al (2005) argue explicitly. Thus, there
appears to be something about R&D that makes it particularly prone to being procyclical,
independently of credit market conditions.
This paper argues that the distinguishing feature of R&D that helps to explain its procyclical-
ity is a dynamic externality inherent to the research process. In particular, when an innovator
comes up with a new idea, she allows others to build on and further proﬁtf r o mh e ri n s i g h t s ,
often at her own expense. This is distinct from a ﬁrm upgrading machines to newer existing
models, which improves its productivity but confers no spillovers to other ﬁrms.
It is already well-known from the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992) that if innovators cannot appropriate the spillovers from their research, there
may be too little steady-state R&D activity. But there is also an important temporal aspect to
this externality that previous work has ignored, and which holds the key to the procyclical bias
in R&D. Since rival innovators are more likely to succeed in improving on a new idea the more
time they have to reﬁn ea n dw o r ko ni t ,t h eb e n e ﬁts from a new idea that pay oﬀ in the future
are increasingly more likely to accrue to someone other than the original innovator. Hence,
the incentives to engage in R&D depend on the short-term beneﬁts of successful innovation.
Since proﬁts are procyclical, innovators chasing short-term proﬁts will undertake more R&D in
2b o o m st h a ni ss o c i a l l yo p t i m a l .I fp r o ﬁts are suﬃciently procyclical, R&D will turn procyclical,
even though booms are precisely when the cost of R&D is highest.3
This paper demonstrates the above intuition in a general equilibrium model. The main
diﬃculty lies not with establishing the procyclical distortion in R&D, but in getting the model
to deliver suﬃciently volatile proﬁts. The standard Schumpeterian model predicts equilibrium
R&D will exhibit a procyclical bias, but it also implies that proﬁts are no more volatile than
other macroeconomic series. As a result, the incentive to shift R&D towards booms will not be
enough to turn R&D procyclical. However, when I modify the model to accord with the fact
that proﬁts are highly procyclical, namely by introducing ﬁxed costs and insuring that markups
are not too countercyclical, the absolute level of R&D will be higher in booms, even though the
optimal path still dictates it should be countercyclical.
I then use the model to explore the welfare implications of such ineﬃciently procyclical R&D.
I show that the distorted timing of R&D increases the cost of achieving productivity growth.
Thus, cyclical ﬂuctuations impose a social cost. This cost is three times as large as what Lucas
(1987) estimated for the cost of business cycles based only on risk aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the evidence on the procyclicality of
R&D and argues it cannot be entirely explained by credit constraints. Section 2 formalizes
the intuition for why equilibrium innovation suﬀers from a procyclical bias. Section 3 extends
these results to a more realistic environment that can be calibrated to assess the welfare impli-
cations of procyclical R&D. Section 4 conjectures whether the results would survive additional
modiﬁcations. Section 5 concludes.
1. Empirical Evidence
I begin by brieﬂy reviewing the evidence on the cyclicality of R&D. As noted in the Introduction,
the classic reference on the cyclical properties of R&D is Griliches (1990). He argues that
3At ﬁrst, this result appears to reiterate the insight in Shleifer (1986) that enterpreneurs introduce new tech-
nologies in booms to capture high proﬁts. However, Shleifer examines when ﬁrms implement new technologies,
not when they undertake R&D. When Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2004) endogenize innovation in Shleifer’s model,
they ﬁnd it is countercyclical: entrepreneurs undertake innovation in recessions, but wait to implement their ideas
in booms. Here, ﬁrms implement new ideas immediately. However, it will still be socially optimal to concentrate
R&D in recessions, which creates strong incentives to concentrate R&D during recessions. The contribution of
this paper is to explain why private entrepreneurs may concentrate R&D in booms despite these incentives.
3both R&D spending and its output, patents, are procyclical.4 Figure 1 reproduces some of
these ﬁndings. In particular, it plots the growth rate of real GDP against the growth rate
of two distinct measures of R&D. The ﬁrst measure is the growth rate of inﬂation-adjusted
expenditures on R&D funded and performed by private industry, as reported by the National
Science Foundation (NSF). The second is the growth rate of full-time equivalent R&D scientists
and engineers employed in companies performing R&D. The latter only captures part of the
inputs into R&D, but it has the advantage that it doesn’t depend on the price of R&D inputs.
This is important, since inﬂation adjustments to nominal R&D expenditures may not accurately
reﬂect changes in the prices of R&D inputs.
As evident from the ﬁgure, the two series track each other relatively closely, and both tend
to track real GDP growth. In particular, the growth rate of R&D declines in nearly all NBER
recession years before 1980. However, R&D appears to be less synchronized with NBER re-
cession years in the second half of the sample. For example, growth in R&D was essentially
ﬂat through the 1980 recession. While growth in R&D employment fell in the 1991 recession,
growth in R&D expenditures only started to decline after the recession ended. Conversely,
although R&D expenditures fell dramatically during the 2001 recession, employment growth in
R&D began to decline several years earlier. But even if the exact timing does not correspond to
NBER dating conventions between 1980 and 2002, R&D growth and GDP growth are positively
correlated over this period.
Figure 1 uses aggregate data. To gain some insight on the role of credit constraints in account-
ing for the procyclical pattern, I turn to ﬁrm level data on R&D expenditures. In particular,
I examine whether ﬁrms that are relatively less credit constrained have less procyclical R&D
expenditures. In this regard, the Standard & Poor’s Compustat database provides data on
R&D expenditures for publicly traded companies. Although this sample does not capture all of
the R&D activity in the NSF data, it turns out that large ﬁrms account for the vast majority
of R&D activity, and thus tracks the aggregate time series quite well. Figure 2 reports the
average growth rate of real R&D over the previous year among all Compustat ﬁrms reporting
positive R&D spending, together with inﬂation adjusted private R&D as reported by the NSF
and depicted in Figure 1. The two series again track each other quite closely; if anything, R&D
growth is more systematically correlated with NBER recession dates among Compustat ﬁrms.
4The fact that patents are synchronized with the business cycle might seem surprising given the time it
presumably takes to undertake research. However, Griliches argues that micro data shows R&D leads to patenting
without signiﬁcant delay: “[T]he evidence is quite strong that when a ﬁrm changes its R&D expenditures, parallel
changes occur also in its patent numbers. The relationship is close to contemporaneous with some lag eﬀects
which are small and not well estimated (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 1986). This is consistent with the
observation that patents tend to be taken out relatively early in the life of a research project.” (p1674).
4I consider two ways of identifying ﬁrms that are relatively unconstrained ﬁnancially. One
i sb a s e do nt h ec a s hﬂow available to the ﬁrm, which would mitigate the need to borrow
externally in order to ﬁnance expenditures. That is, I look at whether the growth rate of R&D
expenditures for ﬁrms that report at least $50 million of cash (in 1996 dollars) in the year in
which they undertake R&D appears less procyclical. This corresponds to the top quintile of the
ﬁr m si nm ys a m p l ea sr a n k e db yt h e i rc a s hﬂow within each year. As an alternative indicator
of constrainedness, I use the net worth of a ﬁrm, given that net worth can be used as collateral
against which the ﬁrm can borrow. That is, I look at the cyclicality of the growth rate of R&D
expenditures for ﬁrms reporting at least $150 million in net worth (in 1996 dollars) in the year
they undertake R&D. Not surprisingly, there is a fair degree of overlap in the two samples.
Figure 3 illustrates the growth rate of real R&D expenditures for these two groups. The results
are striking: the growth rate of R&D among these relatively unconstrained ﬁrms is actually
more synchronized with the business cycle than for the sample as a whole: the correlation with
real GDP growth is higher, and the average growth rate of R&D falls in each NBER recession.
Changing the cutoﬀ levels does not change these qualitative results.
It would therefore appear that even ﬁrms that are relatively free to concentrate their R&D
activity in downturns choose not to do so. But since the opportunity cost of innovation appears
to be countercyclical, we need to explain why ﬁrms would deliberately pursue such a policy.
2. A Model of Schumpeterian Growth
For my model, I use a variation of the Grossman and Helpman (1991) quality-ladder model that
allows for ﬂuctuations in the relative productivity of the goods sector. To maintain tractability,
I initially impose certain restrictions on preferences and technology that are unrealistic but
convey the intuition more transparently. I then relax these in the subsequent section.
The economy consists of a representative agent whose instantaneous utility is given by
U (Ct)=Ct (2.1)
I relax the assumption of risk neutrality in the next section. As will become clear, this assump-
tion plays a role in the analysis, but is not essential. Utility is discounted at rate ρ.
The agent is endowed with a constant labor endowment L pet unit time and an initial capital
stock normalized to one. For now, I assume capital is not accumulable and does not depreciate,
i.e. it is a ﬁxed factor (e.g. land). This assumption will also be relaxed in the next section.
5Labor and capital can be converted into consumption goods according to a two-stage process.
First, labor is converted into a series of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Second,
intermediate goods are combined with capital to produce a non-storable consumption good.
At the second stage, I assume the intermediate goods xjt must ﬁrst be assembled into a
composite good, whose quantity I denote by Xt, using a Cobb-Douglas technology






Given Xt units of this composite good and Kt units of capital, it is possible to produce Yt units




Here zt reﬂects productivity in the ﬁnal goods sector. To capture the fact that productivity in
the goods sector varies over the business cycle, I assume zt follows a Markov switching process
between two states, Z1 ≥ Z0, with a constant hazard rate µ.I t r e a t t h e s e ﬂuctuations as
exogenous, although one could potentially derive them endogenously.5
Turning next to the production for intermediate goods, I assume each good j can be produced
from labor according to a linear technology
xjt = λjtLjt (2.4)
where Ljt denotes the amount of labor employed in the production of good j at date t.T h e
coeﬃcient λjt is given by
λjt = λmjt (2.5)
where λ>1 is a constant and mjt is an integer that denotes the generation of technology used
for producing good j at date t. Each good j starts out at generation mj0, respectively, but
agents can advance to higher-generation technologies by engaging in research. That is, starting
with generation mj,d e v o t i n gRj units of labor to research on good j gives rise to a hazard
φRj of discovering generation mj +1in the next instant, which will be more productive given
λ>1. Once a new generation is discovered, research can begin on the next generation. This
last assumption captures the spillovers inherent to research: when one researcher succeeds in
discovering a new generation, she allows others to build on her work and develop the next
successive technology. In line with the evidence on the acyclicality of productivity in the
research sector, I assume φ is ﬁxed over time.
5For example, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) describe an economy with spillovers in which there are equilibria
where the scale of production, and thus the productivity of individual producers, ﬂuctuates over time.
6To recap, labor in this economy has two uses: production and innovation. Agents must there-
fore choose between producing more consumption goods now and employing labor in research
activities that allow for more consumption goods to be produced in the future.
To see this tradeoﬀ formally, let Mt =
R 1
0 mjtdj denote the average generation across interme-
diate goods, and let Rt =
R 1
0 Rjtdj denote aggregate employment in R&D. We can now express
the output of consumption goods Yt directly in terms of labor resources. In particular, suppose
each sector uses the same amount of labor, i.e. Ljt = L − Rt, which is both optimal and holds




λMt (L − Rt)
¤1−α
(2.6)
The indirect productivity of labor in terms of ﬁnal goods thus depends on both an exogenous
term zt and an endogenous term λ(1−α)Mt.W ea s s u m et h el a wo fl a r g en u m b e r sh o l d sa c r o s s
intermediate goods producers, which implies ˙ Mt = φRt. The growth rate of the endogenous
component of labor productivity is therefore given by
d
dt
λ(1−α)Mt =( 1− α) ˙ Mt lnλ =( 1− α)φRt lnλ (2.7)
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) show the essential tradeoﬀ: faster growth requires a higher Rt,w h i c h
leaves fewer resources to produce goods in the current instant.6 Note that with risk-neutrality,
the utility of the agent is ﬁnite only if the growth rate does not exceed the discount rate ρ,s o
an optimal policy exists only if utility is bounded for any feasible innovation, i.e.
ρ>(1 − α)φLlnλ (2.8)
It will not be necessary to restrict ρ this way when I allow for curvature in the utility function
in the next section.
In the next two subsections, I solve for how the optimal and equilibrium paths of Rt vary with
zt. In particular, I show that equilibrium R&D suﬀers from a procyclical bias. However, due to
the model’s counterfactually low proﬁt volatility, equilibrium R&D remains countercyclical. In
the last subsection, I modify the model to correct its counterfactual implication and show that
when proﬁts are suﬃciently volatile, the optimal path remains countercyclical but equilibrium
innovation will turn procyclical.
6One might ask whether specialized labor employed in R&D is really substitutable for production workers at
high frequencies. While some R&D expenditures involve scientists and engineers who may not be easily shifted
to production, NSF data suggests that on average 40% of wage payments in R&D is allocated to support staﬀ.
72.1. The Social Planner’s Problem
The neo-Schumpeterian view argues it is desirable to concentrate innovation in periods of low
productivity in the goods sector, since it reduces the overall cost of achieving a given average rate
of productivity growth. Solving the planning problem that maximizes the utility of the agent
conﬁrms this intuition. Formally, let Zi for i ∈ {0,1} denote the initial level of productivity,
and recall that M0 denotes the initial value of the average generation across all goods. The
expected utility of the agent under the optimal path starting from z0 = Zi is given by







λMt (L − Rt)
¤1−α
e−ρtdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
(2.9)
subject to the constraint
˙ Mt = φRt
We can rewrite (2.9) recursively as





λM (L − R)
¤1−α






Given the stationarity of the environment, the planner will choose a constant level of employ-
ment R for a given Zi.T h u s ,ﬁnding the optimal policy reduces to ﬁnding a pair of numbers
(R0,R 1). Note that this solution does not specify how innovation varies across intermediate
goods j,s ow l o gw ec a na s s u m eRj = R for all j ∈ [0,1]. I now demonstrate the existence of
an optimal path and argue that it undertakes more innovation when productivity in the ﬁnal
goods sector is low. It is a special case of the more general Proposition 3 below. The proof of
that proposition, along with those of all remaining propositions, is contained in an Appendix.
Proposition 1: If (2.8) is satisﬁed, there exists a unique solution to the social planner’s
problem, and innovation is (weakly) countercyclical along the optimal path, i.e. R0 ≥ R1.
Note that while a countercyclical policy allows the economy to achieve growth at a lower cost,
it also makes output more volatile: fewer inputs will be allocated to production precisely when
productivity is already low. This is irrelevant given the agent is assumed to be risk neutral.
But it may make countercyclical R&D undesirable when the agent is risk averse. I will return
to this issue in the next section.
2.2. Decentralized Equilibrium
I now turn to the decentralized equilibrium of this economy. All goods — both intermediate and
ﬁnal — are produced by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. The technology for producing ﬁnal goods is
8freely available, so proﬁts in this sector will equal zero in equilibrium. By contrast, intermediate
goods producers enjoy some market power: the entrepreneur who discovers the m-th generation
for producing good j earns a patent that grants him exclusive rights to use this technology.
Since no ﬁrm would undertake innovation without patent protection, some monopoly power is
necessary in this environment in order to sustain growth.
In what follows, I focus on equilibria where Rj is the same across all goods j, and where their
common value only depends on the value of aggregate productivity Zi.F o r m a l l y , I r e s t r i c t
attention to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. This is natural given these features are true
for the optimal path. Solving for an equilibrium proceeds in several steps. Brieﬂy, I ﬁrst
express the equilibrium proﬁts of intermediate goods producers π in terms of aggregate R&D
employment R. As an important aside, I observe that equilibrium proﬁts are essentially as
volatile as wages, an important but counterfactual implication of the model. I then use the
expression for proﬁts π to express the value of a successful innovation, v,s t r i c t l yi nt e r m so f
(R0,R 1), aggregate employment in R&D for the two respective levels of aggregate productivity.
The uninterested reader can skip ahead to Proposition 2.
I begin by solving for the price pjt the producer of intermediate good j would charge. Given
the Cobb-Douglas aggregator X, the demand of ﬁnal goods producers for each intermediate
good j will be unit elastic. Thus, each intermediate-goods producer would want to charge as
high a price as possible: his revenue will be constant regardless of the price he charges, but at
higher prices he can produce fewer goods and lower his costs. However, if he were to charge
more than the marginal cost of his next most eﬃcient competitor, the latter could steal away
his business. Thus, in equilibrium, only the monopolist with the most productive technology
will supply goods, at a price pjt equal to the marginal cost of his most eﬃcient competitor.
As Grossman and Helpman observe, incumbent producers beneﬁt less from extending their
lead than new entrants do from overtaking the lead, so only entrants engage in innovation
in equilibrium. Hence, the next most eﬃcient producer will use the (mjt − 1)-th generation
technology.7 Normalizing the wage to 1, the marginal cost of the next most eﬃcient producer
is λ−(mjt−1), the number of labor units he requires to produce a unit of good j.
Let ejt = pjtxjt denote total expenditures by ﬁnal goods producers on intermediate good j.
Given the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation for X, ﬁnal goods producers will equalize expenditures
7As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), this requires that a ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures on a particular interme-
diate good are unobservable, so an incumbent has no incentive to undertake R&D to discourage entry.
9across intermediate good j,i . e .
ejt =( 1− α)PtYt ≡ et
where Pt denotes the price of the ﬁnal good. With the wage normalized to 1,t h ec o s to f
production is just the number of employed workers λ−mjtxjt.S i n c e xjt = et/pjt,t h i sc o s ti s
equal to λ−1et. Hence, the proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm that supplies good j are given by




Proﬁts are thus the same for all goods j,i . e . πjt = πt for all j. To express these proﬁts in
terms of Rt, we use the fact that total spending on consumption goods must equal the income
of the representative agent in equilibrium. Thus, PtYt equals the sum of aggregate proﬁts Πt
and payments to factors,




πtdj − Rt + rtK + L (2.11)
where rt denotes the rental rate of capital at date t. Substituting in for πt from above and
using the fact that cost minimization by ﬁnal goods producers implies rtK = αPtYt allows us
to express equilibrium proﬁts πt in terms of research employment Rt:
πt =( λ − 1)(L − Rt) (2.12)
Note that nominal proﬁts do not depend on zt.T h u s ,f o raﬁxed level of innovation R,p r o ﬁts
are just as cyclically volatile as the numeraire good, labor. As noted above, this counterfactually
implies that the volatility of proﬁts is commensurate with the volatility of the cost of R&D.
This implication will ﬁgure prominently below.
Entrepreneurs who succeed in innovation earn proﬁts (2.12) as long as their technology is the
most advanced. To calculate the value of a successful innovation, let Ijt denote an indicator
which equals 1 if the entrepreneur is the leading-edge producer of good j and zero otherwise,
and let vj denote the value to a claim on the proﬁts of a successful innovation at date 0.S i n c e
the representative agent owns all claims in equilibrium, the price vj must leave him indiﬀerent

















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0
¸
(2.13)
where the expectation above is taken over all possible paths for zt and Ijt. Non-incumbent
ﬁrms choose Rj to maximize the expected value from a successful innovation net of R&D costs
10φRjvj −Rj. It follows that φvj ≤ 1 in equilibrium, with strict equality if Rj > 0. Recall that I
restrict attention to equilibria in which Rjt = Rt for all j. This implies the value of a successful
innovation is the same for each intermediate good j,i . e .vj = v for all j ∈ [0,1].
To express v in terms of R0 and R1, the values that Rt assumes when zt = Z0 and Z1,
respectively, I need to express the price of ﬁnal goods Pt in terms of Rt. Since the production
of ﬁnal goods is competitive, the equilibrium price Pt equals the minimum cost to produce a
single unit of the good in equilibrium, i.e.


















(1 − α)ztλ(1−α)Mt (2.14)
Let vi denote the value of a successful innovation if initial productivity z0 = Zi. Substituting











(λ − 1)(L − Rt)e−ρtdt








It · λ(1−α)MtX (zt)e−ρtdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
subject to ˙ Mt = φRt can be characterized by the recursive equation












ω(R)=ρ + µ +( 1− (1 − α)lnλ)φR
The value of a successful innovation vi can thus be expressed in terms of R0 and R1:





1−α (L − Ri)
α
ω(Ri)ω(R1−i) − µ2 (2.16)
11A symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium is any pair (R0,R 1) in [0,L]
2 where φvi (Ri,R 1−i) ≤ 1,
with strict equality if Ri > 0. The next proposition characterizes these equilibria, and provides
as u ﬃcient condition for a unique equilibrium to exist.8
Proposition 2: Innovation along the equilibrium path is weakly countercyclical in any
symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, i.e. R0 ≥ R1 along any equilibrium path. Moreover, if
λ<e
1
1−α, there exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium.
At ﬁrst glance, these results seem to deny the intuition presented in the Introduction: despite
t h ep r e s e n c eo fs p i l l o v e re ﬀects, equilibrium R&D is countercyclical. However, as I now argue,
the problem lies not with the intuition but with the inability of the model to generate suﬃciently
procyclical proﬁts. In particular, there is a precise sense in which the decentralized economy
exhibits a procyclical bias in R&D. It is only because proﬁts are not suﬃciently procyclical in
the model that this bias is not enough to turn R&D procyclical.
To appreciate why R&D in the market economy suﬀers from a procyclical bias, let us consider
the ratio of the real value of a successful innovation in a boom to its real value in a recession.
This ratio is of interest because the higher it is, the more incentive entrepreneurs have to
undertake their R&D in booms than in recessions. To compute this ratio in equilibrium, we
divide the value of a successful innovation vi in (2.15) by the equilibrium price P of ﬁnal goods




















λMt (L − Rt)
¤1−α
e−ρtdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Z0
¸ (2.17)
where It is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the entrepreneur at date 0 remains the leading
edge producer by date t. For the social planner, the analogous value for a successful innovation
when zt = Zi is given by ∂Vi/∂M,w h e r eVi (M) is given by (2.10). Using the solution to the
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¯ z0 = Z0
¸ (2.18)
8Canton and Uhlig (1999) show that equilibrium innovation is countercyclical in a similar model. Aghion and
Saint Paul (1998) also show equilibrium innovation is countercyclical, but their model assumes only one ﬁrm
undertakes all innovation, so there is no externality that could lead to procyclical innovation.
12Now, suppose we tried to implement the optimal program and set R0 >R 1 in the decentralized
market. Under this program, more output will be produced in booms than in recessions, since
Z1
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λMt (L − R0)
¤1−α
(2.19)
Since the probability that It =1decreases with t, the integrals in (2.17) assign more weight to
output at dates close to t =0than the integrals in (2.18). Combined with the fact that zt is
mean-reverting, it follows that the ratio in (2.17) is higher than the ratio in (2.18). Thus, if we
tried to implement the optimal path in the decentralized economy, entrepreneurs would assign
too much value to innovations in booms relative to recessions, and they will have incentive to
deviate from the optimal path and instead concentrate more of their R&D in booms. This is
the inherent procyclical bias of R&D in the decentralized economy.9
However, this bias is not enough to turn R&D procyclical. As noted above, this is because
equilibrium proﬁts in the model are only as volatile as the cost of R&D: in a recession, both the
cost of R&D and proﬁts fall in proportion to zt. But the expected discounted value of future
proﬁt sf a l l sb yl e s st h a nt o d a y ’ sp r o ﬁts, since zt is stationary and future proﬁts are expected to
eventually revert to their unconditional mean. Hence, the value of a successful innovation falls
by less than the cost of R&D, giving incentive to undertake more innovation in recessions. For
R&D to turn procyclical, the value of a successful innovation must fall by more than the cost
o fR & Di nr e c e s s i o n s ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e sp r o ﬁts to fall by more than the cost of R&D.
Empirically, of course, proﬁts are far more volatile than the cost of R&D. Mansﬁeld (1987)
constructs R&D price indices from 1969 to 1983 and ﬁnds the R&D deﬂator is closely syn-
chronized with the GDP deﬂator at high frequencies, implying real R&D costs are not very
cyclical. This is not surprising given R&D is labor intensive and real wages are only mildly
procyclical. The remainder of this section modiﬁes the model so it can accord with the larger
relative volatility of proﬁts.
2.3. Fixed Costs and the Volatility of Proﬁts
In analyzing the behavior of proﬁts over the business cycle, Ramey (1991) argues an important
piece of evidence is the strongly procyclical pattern in the ratio of aggregate proﬁts to aggregate
9The ineﬃciency concerns relative rather than absolute values of R&D; that is, the tendency towards pro-
cyclical R&D in independent of whether the overall level of R&D is too high or too low relative to the socially
optimal level. Hence, this ineﬃciency is distinct from the one emphasized by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992) concerning the potential ineﬃciency of steady-state growth.






which does not vary with zt. In principle, we could make proﬁts more volatile than sales in
the model by making the markup λt procyclical. However, empirical evidence summarized
in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) suggests markups are moderately countercyclical. This
observation leads Ramey to conclude that the reason observed proﬁts are so volatile over the
business cycle is the presence of ﬁxed costs of production. To see why, suppose producers of














As long as F is constant and the markup λt is not too countercyclical, the ratio of proﬁts to
sales will increase with sales et. Thus, to properly reconcile the model with evidence of highly
volatile proﬁts, we need to introduce ﬁxed costs of production, and at the same time ensure
that markups are not too countercyclical. The remainder of this section modiﬁes the model to
incorporate these two features, and conﬁrms that equilibrium R&D will indeed turn procyclical
when proﬁts are suﬃciently more volatile than the cost of R&D.
The ﬁrst step is to introduce ﬁxed costs of production. Suppose that in order to produce any
intermediate good j ∈ [0,1], a producer must ﬁrst purchase F units of the ﬁnal good. To insure
that the economy doesn’t outgrow this cost, we need to further scale this ﬁx e dc o s ts ot h a ti t
grows at the same rate as the economy. Let us therefore assume that at date t, the amount of
the ﬁnal good required to initiate production is equal to λ(1−α)MtF. The notion that ﬁxed costs
grow with the rest of the economy seems plausible; for example, overhead labor will naturally
become more expensive as overall labor productivity increases.10
The next step is to ensure markups are not too countercyclical. It turns out that introducing
ﬁxed costs of production leads to strongly countercyclical markups. To see why, note that since
demand for each intermediate good is unit elastic, the markup an intermediate goods producer
charges is the gap between his own cost and the price at which his next most eﬃcient competitor
10This begs the question why I did not model the ﬁxed cost directly in terms of labor. The reason is that in
a frictionless model, the price of labor changes with zt.A sar e s u l t ,t h ec o s to fo v e r h e a dl a b o rr i s e si nb o o m s ,
c u t t i n gi n t op r o ﬁts and preventing them from rising too much. Empirically, wages do not appear to respond
much to short term variations over the business cycle, although they certainly grow over longer time horizons.
Assuming the ﬁxed cost is denominated in ﬁnal goods is a way of capturing rigidity in the salaries of overhead
labor without unnecessarily complicating the model. Since I assume the same ﬁxed cost when I solve the planner’s
problem, the planner will take this rigidity into account when choosing R&D.
14breaks even. In a boom, any competitor would earn proportionately higher gross proﬁts at any
given price. At the same time, the ﬁxed cost the competitor faces would remain unchanged. To
keep the rival from entering in a boom, then, an intermediate goods producer would have to
lower his price. In the model, this fall in the markup is large enough so that proﬁts would only
be as volatile as sales, despite the presence of a ﬁxed cost. We therefore need to modify the
model to prevent markups from being so countercyclical. In other words, we need to separate
between the price an incumbent charges and the price at which the producer using the previous
generation technology breaks even.
O n er e a s o nt h et w op r i c e sm i g h td i ﬀer is that new ideas can be partly imitated, and producers
have to set prices to also deter entry from imitators. That is, suppose entrepreneurs can engineer
knock-oﬀ versions of the latest generation of any technology that, while inferior to the leading-
edge technology, are more proﬁtable than the best version of the previous generation. As long
as the price at which an imitator breaks even is not too countercyclical, proﬁts will be more
volatile than sales. The latter will be true if knock-oﬀ versions involve lower ﬁxed costs but
higher variable costs than the leading edge technology. This assumption is plausible; after all,
imitators would not incur the costs of patent protection that a leading-edge producer incurs,
and inferior knock-oﬀs would presumably involve higher variable costs of production than the
technology they imitate. In what follows, I assume the inferior version of each technology is
such that imitators break even at a price of λ times the marginal cost of the leading technology,
implying a constant markup.11 This is a convenient simpliﬁcation; we would obtain similar
results with moderately countercyclical markups.
Before examining the eﬀects of more volatile proﬁts on equilibrium R&D, let us ﬁrst consider
how these modiﬁcations aﬀect the planner’s problem. Since the planner would always employ
the leading technology, the presence of inferior knockoﬀs is irrelevant. However, the planner
will react to the presence of ﬁxed costs. The analog to equation (2.10) now corresponds to



















That is, the planner takes into account that a ﬁxed amount of the output produced must be
spent on overhead. While this changes the optimal level of innovation, there is no reason to
expect it will aﬀect the timing of innovation with respect to zt. The next proposition conﬁrms
that the optimal path is indeed countercyclical, at least at an interior optimum.
11An example of such a knock-oﬀ technology is one where the variable cost is λ times the variable cost under
the new technology and which requires no ﬁxed cost of production. This technology is clearly more proﬁtable
than the leading-edge version of the previous generation.
15Proposition 3: If (2.8) is satisﬁed, there exists a unique solution to the social planner’s
problem. If the optimal level of R&D is always positive, then innovation is countercyclical
along the optimal path, i.e. R0 >R 1. For small F, the optimal path is weakly countercyclical
even if the optimal path involves periods of zero innovation, i.e. R0 ≥ R1.
I now turn to the decentralized economy. Again, the uninterested reader can skip ahead to




et − λ(1−α)MtPtF (2.22)
Once again, we can express proﬁts directly in terms of Rt using the aggregate resource con-
straint. However, the original constraint in (2.11) must be revised to reﬂect the fact that the





= Πt + rtK + L (2.23)
Substituting this aggregate resource constraint into the expression for proﬁts yields
πt =( λ − 1)(L − Rt) − λ(1−α)MtPtF (2.24)
instead of (2.12). Since Pt varies over the cycle, proﬁts πt will be more volatile than the price of
the numeraire good. Solving for Pt, which turns out to be identical to the expression in (2.14),
we obtain the following as the value of a successful innovation:
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Since proﬁts are now more volatile than the cost of R&D, we would expect equilibrium R&D
can turn procyclical. To conﬁrm this conjecture, I begin with the following lemma:
Lemma: Suppose λ<e
1
1−α.T h e nf o ra n yF>0, there exists a unique R∗ <Lsuch that
φv0 (R∗,R ∗)=φv1 (R∗,R ∗). Moreover, there exists a F∗ > 0 such that φvi (R∗,R ∗) < 1 for
F<F ∗ and φvi (R∗,R ∗) > 1 for F>F ∗.
The lemma above establishes that for any ﬁxed cost F, there is a unique level of innovation
R∗ that leaves the nominal value of a successful innovation v constant over the cycle. From the
proof of the lemma, one can show that this value v(R∗,R ∗) increases with F and ranges from
z e r ot oi n ﬁnity, so there must be some F∗ for which it equals 1/φ. As the next proposition
16establishes, if F is greater than F∗, we are assured of ﬁnding a pair (R0,R 1) where R1 >R 0
and which satisﬁes the condition that φvi (Ri,R 1−i)=1for both i ∈ {0,1}.
Proposition 4: Suppose λ<e
1
1−α.I f F>F ∗,w h e r eF∗ is deﬁn e di nL e m m a2,t h e r e
exists a pair R0 <R 1 such that φvi (Ri,R 1−i)=1as required of an interior equilibrium.
Proposition 4 suggests that for suﬃciently large ﬁxed costs, equilibrium innovation will co-
vary positively with productivity.12 More precisely, it states that for large enough ﬁxed costs
we will always be able to ﬁnd a solution for the system of equations that characterize an in-
terior equilibrium such that R1 >R 0. However, this does not guarantee that the solution
(R0,R 1) lies in [0,L]
2 as required of an interior equilibrium. Numerically, though, the solu-
tion does appear to lie in the interior of [0,L]
2 for large L, mirroring a result in Grossman
and Helpman (1991) for the case of no ﬁxed cost. As to whether this equilibrium is unique,
the set {(R0,R 1) | φvi (Ri,R 1−i)=1 } can have multiple solutions. However, these additional
solutions do not appear to correspond to equilibria; rather, they appear to involve very high
levels of innovation (close to L) for which the revenue of intermediate goods producers does not
cover their ﬁxed costs. Experimenting with several parameter values always led to a unique
symmetric Markov equilibrium that was countercyclical if F<F ∗ but procyclical if F>F ∗.
In sum, when rivals are likely to steal away future proﬁts, entrepreneurs act short-sightedly
when they undertake R&D. They will therefore tend to undertake too much R&D in periods
of high proﬁts than is socially optimal. For larger ﬁxed costs of production, which imply more
volatile equilibrium proﬁts, relatively more R&D will be shifted towards booms, until eventually
R&D turns procyclical. However, even for large ﬁxed costs, the optimal path continues to dictate
that R&D be countercyclical.
An important practical question is whether empirically plausible ﬁxed costs are enough to
account for the procyclical pattern of R&D in the data, and if so how costly is this procyclicality
of R&D. To address these questions, I need to relax some of the assumptions above to make the
model more amenable to quantitative analysis. This is precisely what I do in the next section.
As an aside, it is worth noting here that although unrealistic, the assumption of risk neutrality
does highlight some of the model’s stark welfare implications. Consider the implied welfare cost
of volatility in the model, i.e. the cost of moving from an economy with constant productivity
12One has to be careful about referring to this variation as procyclical, since it is possible that output will fall
when productivity Z rises. In all of my numerical simulations, though, output comoves with productivity.
17Z to one in which zt ﬂuctuates between Z0 and Z1 where E [zt]=Z. In the stable environment,
the optimal path mandates a constant level of R. Under risk neutrality, the planner can always
achieve the same expected utility in the stochastic environment by adopting the same R,s i n c e















Z (L − R)
1−α − F
´
Since Proposition 3 tells us the optimal (interior) path will vary R with zt,i tf o l l o w st h a tt h e
planner can achieve an even higher utility. By contrast, in the decentralized economy, welfare
can be lower in the volatile environment than in the stable one. Hence, cyclical ﬂuctuations
can reduce welfare even when they allow a benevolent planner to achieve a higher utility.T h i s
cost is due to the suboptimal use of resources in response to time-varying productivity, and
is distinct from the cost of consumption volatility in Lucas (1987) due to risk aversion. It is
also distinct from previous work that argues cycles are costly because they aﬀect growth, e.g.
Barlevy (2004), which involves the volatility of innovation rather than its timing. Once I allow
for risk-aversion, ﬂuctuations may no longer necessarily allow the planner to achieve a higher
utility than in a stable environment. Nevertheless, ﬂuctuations still allow the planner to achieve
growth at a lower overall cost, which the ineﬃcient timing of innovation in the decentralized
equilibrium precludes.
3. Schumpeterian Growth with Concave Utility and Accumulable Capital
As noted in the previous section, concentrating innovation in recessions lowers the average
cost of growth but increases the volatility of output. Under the assumption of risk neutrality,
this volatility is inconsequential. However, when the utility function exhibits curvature, this
volatility may make it undesirable to concentrate innovation in recessions. This section modiﬁes
the model to allow for concave utility, and examines whether procyclical innovation remains
ineﬃcient for empirically plausible assumptions.
In introducing risk aversion, it will be important to also relax the assumption that capital
is not accumulable. Otherwise, the only way to smooth consumption over the cycle is to vary
R&D with productivity, implying procyclical R&D may in fact be optimal. In practice, though,
there are other options to smooth consumption such as inventories and capital accumulation,
and since these activities do not occur at the expense of current production, they presumably
dominate R&D for purposes of consumption smoothing.
18Formally, I modify the model in two ways. First, I replace (2.1) with a more reasonable utility
U (Ct)=l nCt (3.1)
Log utility also allows us to drop the restriction on ρ in (2.8). Second, I replace the assumption
that Kt ≡ 1 for all t with the assumption that capital satisﬁes the law of motion
˙ Kt = It − δKt (3.2)
where It denotes investment, i.e. net output of ﬁnal goods that is not consumed, and δ denotes
the rate at which capital depreciates. Finally, since capital accumulation contributes to growth,
we need to scale the ﬁxed cost of production diﬀerently. Speciﬁcally, an intermediate goods
producer will now require λMtF units of consumption good to initiate production at date t.
While these modiﬁcations are simple to describe, they greatly complicate the analysis by
introducing additional state variables. In the next two subsections, I sketch out how to derive
the optimal and equilibrium paths of R in this environment. I then solve for these paths
numerically for parameter values meant to replicate certain features of U.S. data, and show
that equilibrium innovation is indeed ineﬃciently procyclical at empirically plausible parameter
values.
3.1. The Social Planner’s Problem
I begin with the planner’s problem. In lieu of (2.9), the planner’s problem is now given by










λMt (L − Rt)
¤1−α
− λMtF − It
´
e−ρtdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
s.t. 1. ˙ Mt = φRt
2. ˙ Kt = It − δKt
To solve this problem, deﬁne k = λ−MK and ι = λ−MI. Using the law of motion for M,o n e
can show that Vi (K0,M 0)=vi (k)+M0
lnλ
ρ
,w h e r evi (k) satisﬁes
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19The planner can now control two variables, investment and R&D. The ﬁrst-order conditions for
the maximization problem with respect to these two variables are
1
Zikα (L − R)
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Substituting the ﬁrst equation into the second yields the following formula for Ri,t h ev a l u eo f
R&D when productivity is equal to Zi:










Rather than two numbers R0 and R1, an optimal plan now corresponds to two functions R0 (k)
and R1 (k). I will refer to a policy as procyclical if it assigns R1 (k) >R 0 (k) for any k in the
limiting set of capital-to-productivity ratios for this economy, i.e. for any level of k that occurs
inﬁnitely often along the optimal path with probability 1, and countercyclical if R1 (k) <R 0 (k)
for all such k. Note that this deﬁnition may not correspond to the way R&D would appear to
covary with zt in data generated by this model, since changes in capital accumulation over the
cycle may oﬀset the response of R&D to changes in productivity for a ﬁxed k.
To solve for Ri (k), we need an expression for the value function vi (k). Since the system in
(3.3) does not yield a closed-form solution, I need to solve it numerically. My implementation
uses a collocation method whereby I approximate each vi (k) with a polynomial in k.13
3.2. Decentralized Equilibrium
Next, I characterize the equilibrium allocation. Certain features of the equilibrium remain
unchanged from the previous section. For example, intermediate good producers will continue
to charge the price at which their next most eﬃcient rival breaks even. Once again, I assume
new ideas can be imperfectly imitated, and the price at which an imitator breaks even is
pjt = λ−(mjt−1). As such, nominal proﬁts for each producer once again correspond to (2.24).
The price of ﬁnal goods P is analogous to but a little diﬀerent from (2.14), namely
P =
λ1−M (L − R)
α
z (1 − α)kα (3.4)
13More precisely, I obtain an n-th order polynomial approximation of each function by choosing n+1 coeﬃcients
such that when I replace the true vi (k) with the approximate function, (3.3) is exactly satisﬁed at n+1particular
values of k. These particular values correspond to the roots of the ﬁrst n +1Chevyshev polynomials, adapted
to the limiting interval for k. The results reported in the paper are based on fourth-order polynomials.
20As in the previous section, I only consider symmetric Markov equilibria. In equilibrium, the
path for R must satisfy the free entry condition φv =1 , where recall v denotes the expected
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¸
With risk aversion, U0 (Ct) is no longer a constant. Hence, the value of a successful innovation
depends on the consumption of the household. In order to solve for an equilibrium, then, we
would need to solve the household problem.
The household problem can be characterized as follows. At any point in time, a household
must decide how to divide its wealth between physical capital and claims on entrepreneurial
proﬁts. It does this taking as given the distribution of future prices, e.g. the price of capital, the
rate of return on capital, the proﬁts it expects entrepreneurs to earn, and so on. In addition,
the household must choose how much of its wealth to use to ﬁnance consumption.
Since the household must own all of the claims to entrepreneurial proﬁts in equilibrium, it will
be convenient to pretend as if there was a mutual fund company that pooled all entrepreneurs
into a single portfolio on behalf of the household. Arbitrage requires the value of this portfolio
to be the same as the cost of buying up all ﬁrms, which is just
R 1
0 vdj = v. To insure the fund
continues to own all incumbents, it must pay the research expenses of any potential innovator
in exchange for the rights to the patent if the innovator is successful, i.e. the fund deducts an
operating expense R out of dividends. Thus, as far as the household is concerned, it can either
allocate its wealth to physical capital or to an asset whose price is v and which yields a dividend
of Π = π − R per unit time, where π is given by (2.22).
Let w denote the household’s nominal wealth and σ denote the fraction of this wealth the
household allocates to capital. The instantaneous change in the household’s nominal wealth
from its investments in physical capital derives from rental income and capital gains. As long
as aggregate productivity remains constant over the next instant, the return per unit of capital
is r + ˙ P, and the number of units of capital it holds is σw/P. Similarly, as long as aggregate
productivity zt remains constant, the return per share of the mutual fund it owns is Π + ˙ v,
and the number of shares it owns in the mutual fund is (1 − σ)w/v. Note that the free entry
condition implies ˙ v =0 . In addition to the returns to its assets, the household also earns
labor income and spends some of its resources on consumption. As long as zt is constant, then,














w + L − λMPc (3.5)
21where c = λ−MC. If instead productivity zt changes in the next instant, the nominal value of
the physical capital the household owns will jump as the price of capital P itself jumps. The
nominal value of wealth held in the mutual fund does not change, however, since the value of
the mutual fund v = φ−1 independently of aggregate productivity. Hence, the wealth of the





σ +( 1− σ)
¸
w (3.6)
Let W denote the aggregate wealth of the economy. In equilibrium, of course, w = W.
However, since individual households act as price takers, they treat the path of W as given
and assume it determines the values of all relevant economic variables. Let Ri (W) denote the
equilibrium employment in R&D when zt = Zi and aggregate wealth is Wi.I fw ek n e wRi (W),
we would be able to derive all remaining equilibrium quantities. For example, using the fact
that W = PK + v = λMPk+ φ−1 and the expression for P in (3.4), we can solve for the
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We can similarly express the nominal quantities r, P,a n dΠ as functions of W.T h i si m p l i e s
we can express the household problem recursively in terms of two state variables, w and W:




















subject to (3.5) and (3.6), the free entry condition φv =1 , and the laws of motion for W,i . e .
if zt remains constant over the next instant, then
˙ W =
³
r + ˙ P
´
λMk + Π + L − λMPc(W,W) (3.8)
while if zt changes over the next instant, W will jump to W∗,w h e r e
W∗ = λMP1−iki (W)+φ−1























22An equilibrium therefore corresponds to a set of functions w∗
i (w), Vi (w,W),a n dRi (W) which
satisfy equations (3.6), (3.7), and (3.9).
Again, I can only solve this equilibrium numerically. In particular, I approximate Ri (W)
and w∗
i (w) using n-th degree polynomials in W and w, respectively, and I approximate the





ak wkW .T h ec o e ﬃcients of these polynomials
are chosen so that the equations above hold exactly at particular values of (w,W).14
3.3. Calibration and Results
I now proceed to solve the model numerically for particular parameter values. Since this version
of the model corresponds to a standard real business cycle model, only with an endogenously
determined growth rate, I can build on previous literature in assigning many of its parameters.
The particular values I use are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
ρ 0.05 Z0 0.94 µ 0.20 λ 1.20 F 3.6
α 0.33 Z1 1.06 δ 0.08 φ 0.10 L 30.8
Normalizing a unit of time in the model to correspond to a year, the discount rate ρ is set to
5%. The share of capital in the production of ﬁnal goods is set to one third. To accord with
an unconditional standard deviation of detrended productivity growth of 6%,Is e tZ0 to 0.94
and Z1 to 1.06. The transition rate µ is set so that the average length of a complete cycle is 10
years, slightly longer than the 8 year frequency often used to identify business cycle ﬂuctuations.
The depreciation rate is set to 8% per year. For λ, I follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
in calibrating the markup to 20%. The productivity term φ turns out to be a pure scaling
parameter, so I normalize it to 0.10.
The remaining two parameters, F and L, are chosen to yield a growth rate of 2% per year
and a share of R&D in output of 2%, in accordance with the average share of total R&D
expenditures (private and public, since both can contribute to long-run growth) in GDP. It is
not obvious whether the model counterpart to the latter statistic is the share of R&D in gross
14In particular, the set of points w that I use correspond to the roots of the Chebyshev polynomials, adapted
to the limiting interval for w. The set of values for W are the same as for w, but I focus on the triangular
array {wi,W j}1≤i≤j≤n+1. Note that I need to approximate V (w,W) on and oﬀ the equilibrium path (in which
w = W) to approximate both ∂Vi/∂w and ∂Vi/∂W.
23output or output net of the amount used by intermediate goods producers to cover ﬁxed cost.
However, at F =3 .6, R&D accounts for 2.0% of gross output and 2.2% of net output, which are
virtually indistinguishable. Either way, R&D accounts for a tiny share of GDP, as it does in the
data. Simulating the model for these parameter values reveals that the model also generates
reasonable time variation in R&D: the standard deviation of the log R&D share over time is
0.139 and 0.136 for gross and net output respectively, compared to 0.137 for the log share of
total R&D between 1953 and 2002.
Measured against output, the value of F implies that ﬁxed costs account for 8.1% of gross
output (and 8.8% of net output). By comparison, Basu (1996), following Ramey (1991), suggests
using non-production workers as a proxy for overhead labor. Non-production workers account
for about 20% of the labor force during the post-War period. Since labor accounts for two-thirds
of total output, this suggests an even larger overhead cost of 13% of output.
Figure 4 plots both optimal and equilibrium Ri (k) for the parameter values in Table 1. In each
case, only the limiting set for k is depicted. For the parameter values in Table 1, optimal R&D
policy is countercyclical, despite the fact that the representative household is risk-averse. This
is consistent with the notion that capital accumulation is a much more eﬃcient way to smooth
consumption that varying R&D. Equilibrium R&D, by contrast, is unambiguously procyclical,
even after accounting for more rapid capital accumulation in booms.
Comparing the axes of the two panels in Figure 4 reveals that optimal R&D is an order of
magnitude larger than equilibrium R&D. This result mirrors the ﬁndings of Jones and Williams
(2000), although the wedge between the optimal and equilibrium levels of R&D is larger than in
their analysis. This is because Jones and Williams allow for diminishing returns to R&D; with
linear returns to R&D, the planner would want to devote almost all available labor resources
to innovation. One should therefore be skeptical about this model’s predictions for optimal
R&D. However, as long as we limit attention to small perturbations around the non-stochastic
equilibrium, we can use this model to analyze the eﬃciency of observed R&D. This is because
the equilibrium of the model is calibrated to match average long-run growth in the data, and
curvature in the production function for R&D is irrelevant when shocks are small enough since
the production function is locally linear. Thus, the calibrated model should be informative as
whether the procyclical R&D we observe in the data is socially ineﬃcient.
Formally, suppose aggregate productivity ﬂuctuates between Z0 =1−ε and Z1 =1+ε,w h e r e
ε is small. Let R denote non-stochastic steady state equilibrium R&D when Z0 = Z1 =1 .F o r
ε small, we can approximate the equilibrium of the stochastic economy by R0 =( 1 − ε0)R
24and R1 =( 1+ε0)R for some ε0 > 0. We can then check numerically the eﬀect of changing ε0
on welfare. For the parameter values in Table 1, the welfare of the representative household
proves to be decreasing in ε0. Thus, independently of what our calibration implies for the
global optimum, the representative household would be better oﬀ if the timing of R&D were
countercyclical as opposed to procyclical, to a degree that depends on the exact process for zt.
Note the cost of procyclical R&D in the model is fundamentally a cost of macroeconomic
volatility; in a stable environment where Z0 = Z1 =1 , there is no opportunity to distort
the timing of R&D in a way that would make growth more costly. Thus, the implied cost of
procyclical R&D is related to the implied cost of macroeconomic volatility in the model. Let
us therefore compare the utility of the household when Z0 = Z1 =1with the utility of the
same household when Z0 and Z1 are as in Table 1. For concreteness, I evaluate both utilities
starting at the deterministic steady-state level of k, and for the stochastic environment I assume
z0 is distributed according to the invariant distribution for zt. Following Lucas (1987), we can
express the change in utility in terms of the fraction of lifetime consumption agents would be
willing to give up to remain in the stable environment. By a standard Taylor approximation
argument, the cost of moving to a volatile environment is proportional to the variance of
aggregate productivity σ2
z. For the parameter values in Table 1, I calculate this constant of
proportionality to be approximately 1. We can then decompose this cost into a cost due to
volatility in zt holding R&D ﬁxed at its deterministic equilibrium level (but allowing agents to
accumulate capital), and a cost due to changes in equilibrium R&D. The former cost reﬂects
the cost of volatility due to risk aversion, while the latter reﬂects the cost due to the eﬀect of
ﬂuctuations on growth. For the parameter values in Table 1, I calculate the cost of volatility
holding R&D ﬁxed to be approximately 1
3σ2
z. Taking into account the ineﬃcient response of
R&D to aggregate ﬂuctuations fully triples the cost of business cycles relative to models in
which the growth rate is treated as exogenous and ﬁxed.
Of course, since σ2
z is small empirically, the implied welfare cost of procyclical R&D is small.
For example, when σz =6 %as in Table 1, the cost of ﬂuctuations is 0.36% of lifetime consump-
tion. This is indeed three times as large as Lucas’ estimated cost of business cycles using direct
evidence on consumption (as opposed to calibrating to productivity shocks). That said, this
estimate probably understates the true cost of the ineﬃcient timing of R&D over the cycle. This
is because the model substantially underpredicts the volatility of trend growth φRlnλ.T h e
standard deviation of trend growth in the model is about 0.2 percentage points. By contrast,
when Barlevy (2004) estimates the volatility of trend growth, he ﬁnds a standard deviation
of 1.8 percentage points. To be sure, not all of this variation is due to R&D. However, as is
well-known, the preferences I use fail to generate asset prices that are as volatile as in the data.
25This is important, since asset prices aﬀect the incentives of ﬁrms to engage in innovation, and
more volatile asset prices would result in more volatile trend growth. Recent work has argued
that allowing for time non-separable preferences can help to reconcile RBC models with asset
prices. Analyzing the model with this class of preferences would be an important next step for
getting a better sense of the cost of the ineﬃcient timing of R&D.
Finally, since the ﬁxed cost F plays an essential role, some discussion of the robustness of the
results to changes in this parameter are in order. In particular, how do the results change as we
vary F while adjusting L to maintain a steady-state growth rate of 2% per year? As F is driven
to zero, equilibrium innovation turns countercyclical. How large does F have to be for R&D
to be procyclical? For the parameters values in Table 1, the cutoﬀ level above which R&D is
procyclical is approximately 3.3. This corresponds to a ﬁxed cost of about 8.6% of net output,
implying that ﬁxed costs cannot be much smaller than those I calibrated. For larger values of F
than in Table 1, equilibrium R&D is procyclical. Moreover, a similar perturbation analysis to
the one reported above reveals that this procyclical pattern remains ineﬃcient for much larger
values of F. Interestingly, the optimal path for R&D — which recall may be suspect given the
absence of diminishing returns — actually turns procyclical for high values of F.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
increasing F acts in a similar way to increasing the curvature of the utility function. Since along
the optimal path the planner uses almost all labor resources for R&D rather than production,
ﬂuctuations in consumption are large in a proportional sense. Thus, a very risk-averse planner
would resort to using even R&D to smooth consumption, especially given that the amount of
resources devoted to R&D at the optimal path is so large. But since the equilibrium R&D
share of GDP is only 2%, there is very little to gain from using R&D to smooth consumption
in practice, and the procyclical pattern in equilibrium R&D remains suboptimal even when the
optimal path turns procyclical.
4. Extensions
While the previous section goes some lengths to render the model more plausible, it still ab-
stracts from certain features that may be relevant for its conclusions. This section brieﬂyr a i s e s
some of these considerations and speculates on whether the results above are likely to survive
the introduction of further modiﬁcations.
One feature the model abstracts from is that innovations take time to bring to fruition,
so ﬁrms should not expect to be able to bring their innovations on-line as soon as aggregate
conditions improve, which they conceivably can under a Poisson technology for innovation.
26Introducing diﬀusion lags might make entrepreneurs reluctant to undertake more innovation in
booms if they are inherently temporary. Formally, suppose an idea discovered at date t can
only be used for production at date t + T.B yc o n t i n u i t y ,i n e ﬃcient timing would continue to
arise even for very small T.F o rl a r g e rT, we would have to explicitly solve the model. This is
quite diﬃcult, since the whole continuum of productivity levels [zt−T,z t] enter as state variables.
But intuitively, R&D should remain procyclical as long as shocks are persistent. That is, since
Pr(zt+T = zt | zt) > Pr(zt+T 6= zt | zt), a potential entrant who is constrained to implement
his invention only after T units of time should still expect proﬁts at the time of implementation
to be higher starting in a boom than in a recession. Diﬀusion lags mitigate the beneﬁts to
procyclical R&D, but R&D should still be procyclical for suﬃciently large ﬁxed costs.
Another feature the model abstracts from is the possibility that ﬁrms strategically delay the
time they implement their innovation, a point raised by Shleifer (1986). This is particularly
relevant when aggregate productivity varies over time, since ﬁrms can potentially undertake
innovation in recessions when the cost of R&D is low but wait until booms to implement them.15
While this intuition is suggestive, allowing for strategic delay need not eliminate the ineﬃcient
timing of innovation. This is best illustrated using the version of the model in Section 2. The
next Proposition provides conditions under which the equilibrium in Proposition 4 survives
even when ﬁrms can strategically delay implementing their innovations:






. Then there exists a F0 >F∗ as deﬁned
in Lemma 2 such that the (R0,R 1) identiﬁed in Proposition 4 remains an equilibrium for all
F ∈ (F∗,F0) even if agents can delay implementation.
Intuitively, as long as the discount rate ρ is large and regime switches are infrequent so µ is
small, it will not pay to delay innovation until a boom given the long expected wait until it
arrives. The notion that ﬁrms do not strategically delay innovation does have some empirical
support. As already noted in an earlier footnote, Griliches (1990) notes that ﬁrms tend to take
out patents — and thus reveal their new ideas — early on in the research process, long before
they put their new ideas to use. Moreover, strategic delay would imply a mismatch between
R&D activity and patenting over the cycle, whereas Griliches reports that R&D and patents
remain highly synchronized over the business cycle.
If the assumptions of Proposition 5 are not satisﬁed, ﬁrms might very well prefer to delay
15Indeed, this is what Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) ﬁnd when they endogenize R&D in Shleifer’s model.
However, in their model the recession emerges endogenously as a result of R&D activity rather than as the result
of an exogenous change in productivity.
27implementation until aggregate productivity is high, and the equilibrium with procyclical in-
novation may not survive. In this case, something else would be required to account for the
procyclical pattern in R&D we observe in the data. However, if in equilibrium some of the
new ideas discovered in recessions are only implemented in booms, the ineﬃciency described
here would simply carry over from innovation to implementation: a benevolent planner would
choose to concentrate both innovation and implementation in recessions, but in the decentral-
ized economy implementation would be procyclical even if innovation were not. The ineﬃcient
implementation of new ideas — as opposed to the ineﬃcient allocation of resources in coming
up with new ideas — is related to results in Caballero and Hammour (1996), who show in a
diﬀerent setting that the process of adopting new technologies can be distorted in the presence
of frictions. Unfortunately, strategic delay in the presence of aggregate ﬂuctuations is diﬃcult
to analyze. Although Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) can fully characterize strategic delay in
the same model as this one but where aggregate productivity zt is ﬁxed over time, it turns out
that their approach cannot be easily extended to the case of time-varying productivity.
5. Conclusion
In recent years, a growing number of economists has argued that recessions encourage agents
to invest in making their technologies more productive. But one of the important channels for
productivity growth, R&D eﬀort, appears to be procyclical. This paper provides an explanation
for why R&D is procyclical even though, as the neo-Schumpeterian view argues, it is eﬃcient to
concentrate it in recessions. This captures the spirit of recent work by Caballero and Hammour
(2004), who also question whether recessions promote the reallocation of resources to more
productive uses. Focusing on job reallocation, they conclude that “on the contrary, cumulative
restructuring is lower following recessions... yet — contrary to the cost-of-liquidations view —
this stiﬂing of reallocation is costly.” This paper considers R&D rather than job reallocation,
but it similarly argues that recessions lead to lower R&D activity, not higher, and that this
stiﬂing of R&D is costly. Recessions thus fail to act as an incubator for productivity growth,
even when in principle they ought to play that role.16
At the same time, as already noted in the Introduction, some growth-enhancing activities are
countercyclical. One prominent example is schooling. Betts and McFarland (1995) and Dellas
and Sakellaris (2003) document countercyclical college enrollment for the U.S., especially for
16On a related note, Barlevy (2002) argues that search frictions may prevent recessions from reallocating
resources to their most appropriate uses, even though recessions should ameliorate productive ineﬃciency by
cleansing out less productive uses of resources.
28part-time students, while Sepulveda (2002) ﬁnds participation in training courses, both on and
oﬀ the job, are countercyclical. In the opposite direction, King and Sweetman (2002) argue that
the number of workers who quit their job to return to school is procyclical, although full-time
commitment to school is a special form of human capital accumulation that may be sensitive to
the diﬃculty of ﬁnding jobs in recessions. The fact that schooling is countercyclical but R&D
is not is consistent with the notion that schooling is not associated with dynamic externalities
that would cause agents to behave in a short-sighted manner.
The quantitative analysis in this paper suggests the ineﬃcient timing of R&D leads to a
small welfare cost, although the implied cost of business cycles is larger than in Lucas (1987).
Interestingly, the optimal policy response does not involve stabilization. In fact, since cyclical
ﬂuctuations allow the economy to grow at a lower overall cost, policymakers might very well
welcome ﬂuctuations (provided agents are not too risk averse), at least if they can induce
agents to substitute intertemporally and undertake R&D in recessions. This could presumably
be achieved through subsidies to R&D in recessions. By contrast, given evidence that relatively
unconstrained ﬁrms continue to concentrate their R&D in booms, a policy of easing credit
conditions in recessions by itself may not suﬃce to induce countercyclical R&D.
While this paper focuses primarily on business cycles, it also contributes to the literature
on long-run growth. Whereas most of this literature considers steady-state growth, this paper
explores non-steady-state dynamics in traditional growth models. It reveals that spillovers
inherent to the R&D process can lead not only to too much or too little steady-state growth,
as previous work has already documented, but also to an ineﬃcient response to shocks around
the steady state. Thus, whereas previous work suggests that there is a special case in which
various forces cancel out so that steady-state equilibrium growth is optimal, the results here
suggest that even in this special case, the response of R&D to shocks around its steady state is
necessarily suboptimal. The ability of the decentralized market to achieve an eﬃcient level of
growth would therefore appear to be even more fragile than suggested in previous work.
29Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s1a n d3 : For given values of {Ri}i=0,1, the system given by (2.10) reduces to ordinary
linear diﬀerential equations in V (Zi,M). Standard theorems ensure this system has a unique solution. Hence,
starting with values for Ri, we can use the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to ﬁn dt h eu n i q u ev a l u ef u n c t i o n s
V (Zi,M) associated with a given pair (R0,R 1). I conjecture that the value function V (·,·) takes the form
V (Zi,M)=viλ
M(1−α)





which simpliﬁes the diﬀerential equations above to a system of independent linear equations in the coeﬃcients
vi:
ρvi = Zi (L − Ri)
1−α − F + µ(v1−i − vi)+( 1− α)viφRi lnλ
This yields a unique solution (v0,v 1) as functions of (R0,R 1).
Since the RHS of (2.10) is strictly concave in Ri,t h eﬁrst order condition is both necessary and suﬃcient to
characterize the optimal Ri.T h eﬁrst order condition is given by
−(1 − α)Ziλ




φ ≤ 0 (5.1)
















If we substitute this expression into the asset equation (2.10), we obtain a pair of equations with v1−i as a
function of vi that hold at the optimal Ri:


































1) which solves the equations
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∗





0 = g0 (v
∗
1)
The function g1−i (·) is continuous and diﬀerentiable, since the left and right hand derivatives at vi =
Zi
φLα lnλ
are both equal to
ρ + µ
µ
.S i n c eρ>(1 − α)φLlnλ, it follows that
∂g1−i (vi)
∂vi
> 1 for all vi. The functions g1−i (·)



































> 0This monotonicity insures there is at most one value of v
∗
0. To establish existence, note that g1 (0) < 0 while
g
−1
0 (0) > 0. Hence, g1 (0) − g
−1


















is strictly bounded away from 0,a n ds og1 (x) − g
−1
0 (x) →∞as x →∞ . The existence of
v
∗
0 follows from continuity. This implies there is a unique social solution to the social planner’s problem.
Next, suppose that the optimal path dictates Ri > 0 for both i. I need to show R0 >R 1. The proof proceeds





































Consider the ﬁxed point   vi which solves
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< 1, we know that for any x<  v1, it follows that x − g
−1
0 (x) < 0 .
Hence,
g1 (  v0) − g
−1
0 (  v0)=  v0 − g
−1
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< 0






0)=0and g1 (x) − g
−1
0 (x) is increasing
in x, it follows that v
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0.B u ts i n c ev
∗
1 = g1 (v
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,w h i c hi ss u ﬃcient to establish R1 <R 0 from the
ﬁrst-order condition above. Combining the equations v
∗
1−i = g1−i (v
∗



























































But given the expression for Ri in (5.2), this implies R0 >R 1.Finally, suppose Ri =0for some i. The proposition follows if we can rule out the case where R0 =0and











i (Z0,Z 1) denote the
values of v
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    
    
(L − R1)φlnλ
φ(L − R1)lnλ + αφR1 lnλ
v1
Z1
if R1 > 0
(ρ + µ)Z0L
1−α








ρ + µ − (1 − α)φR1−i lnλ
∂v1
∂Z1
where A is deﬁned by
Z0L
1−α + A =m a x
R0
 
Z0 (L − R0)
1−α +( 1− α)v0φR0 lnλ
 

























, completing the proof. ¥













,w h e r eω (L)=ρ + µ +( 1− (1 − α)lnλ)φL.T h e r ee x i s t sa
unique ξ
∗ > 0 such that 1 − ξ
∗ T h(ξ
∗) if ξ S ξ
∗. This unique solution ξ
∗ lies in the interval (0,1).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : First, I claim there exists a ξ
∗ ∈ (0,1) for which 1 − ξ = h(ξ). This is straightforward:
if ξ =0 ,w eh a v e
1 − ξ =1> 0=h(ξ)
while if ξ =1 ,w eh a v e











where the inequality relies on the fact that ω (L) > 0 given that ρ>(1 − α)φLlnλ. The claim follows from
continuity.To prove ξ































Since at ξ =1 , h(ξ) > 1 − ξ, a necessary condition for there to exist a ξ
∗ > 1 such that 1 − ξ
∗ = h(ξ
∗) is that
there exists a ξ>1 such that h
0 (ξ) < −1.T h u s ,t h e r ee x i s t sn oξ>1 for which 1 − ξ = h(ξ).
Next, I need to show there is a unique ξ
∗ ∈ (0,1) for which 1 − ξ
∗ = h(ξ
∗). Consider ﬁrst the case where
α>
1
2.D i ﬀerentiating h(·) establishes that h
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∗ is unique and 1 − ξ
∗ T h(ξ













2 which is monotonically increasing in ξ while 1−ξ is monoton-
ically decreasing. This again insures ξ
∗ is unique and 1 − ξ
∗ T h(ξ




2, it is enough to prove that h































2 is strictly greater than 1.B u ti tw a s
previously argued that h
0 (ξ) > −1 for all ξ ≥ 1. Hence, h
0 (ξ) > −1 for all ξ ∈ (0,∞) if α<
1
2.
Lastly, since at ξ =0 , 1−ξ =1> 0=h(ξ),c o n t i n u i t yi m p l i e s1−ξ>h(ξ) for all ξ<ξ
∗.L i k e w i s e ,a tξ =1 ,
1 − ξ =0<h(1), so by continuity it follows that 1 − ξ<h(ξ) for ξ>ξ
∗. This establishes the lemma. ¥Proof of Proposition 2:S i n c eRi ≥ 0, the case where R1 =0trivially satisﬁes the claim. If R0 =0 ,w en e e d
to verify that R1 =0 . To show this, suppose not, i.e. suppose R1 > 0=R0. Then it follows that φv1 =1≥ φv0.




























Since v1(R1,R 0)=0if R1 = L,t h e nR1 <Lin any such equilibrium. This allows us to deﬁne ξ such that
R0 = ξR1 +( 1− ξ)L
Note that since R1 <L ,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,ξ ≥ 0,a n dR0 >R 1 implies ξ ∈ [0,1) while R0 <R 1 implies ξ>1.
After substituting in for ω (R) and rewriting R0 in terms of R1, we can rewrite the inequality v1 ≥ v0 in terms
of ξ:













Applying lemma 1, it follows that ξ<ξ
∗ < 1, which implies R0 >R 1, a contradiction. Thus, R0 =0implies
R1 =0 .
Finally, if R1 and R0 are both positive, it must be true that v1 = v0 =
1
φ
, which in turn implies that
1 − ξ = h(ξ). But from the lemma, the unique ξ
∗ which satisﬁes this equation is less than 1, which implies
R0 ≥ R1.
Next, I show that there exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium when λ<e
1
1−α.T h i sc o n d i t i o n
implies that (1 − α)lnλ<1, which implies
ω
0 (R)=( 1− (1 − α)lnλ)φ>0
Using (2.16), the fact that ω






< 0.R e c a l l f r o mt h e
proof of Proposition 2 that in any Markov-perfect equilibrium in which φvi (Ri,R 1−i)=1for both i, the levels
of innovation for the two levels of productivity are related by R0 = ξ
∗R1 +( 1− ξ
∗)L,w h e r eξ
∗ is a constant.
Hence, there can be at most one equilibrium in which φv0 = φv1 =1 . For suppose there were two such equilibria,




1) where wlog R
0
0 >R 0.S i n c eξ
∗ is constant, it follows that R
0
1 >R 1, but since vi is decreasing








If (R0,R 1)=( 0 ,0) is an equilibrium, given that
∂vi
∂Ri
< 0, it follows that for any (R0,R 1) 6=0there always
exists some i ∈ {0,1} such that φvi < 1 but Ri > 0, which is inconsistent with equilibrium. In this case, (0,0)
would be the unique equilibrium. Without loss of generality, then, I henceforth assume that if an equilibrium
exists, it is not equal to (0,0).








1−i)=1for both i,t h e r ee x i s t s
no other equilibria in which Ri =0and φvi (0,R 1−i) < 1 for some i ∈ {0,1}.F o re a c hi,d e ﬁne the contour sets
Ωi = {(Ri,R 1−i) | φvi (Ri,R 1−i)=1 }
for all values of (R0,R 1) ≥ (0,0). These sets are illustrated in Figure A2. Using the implicit function theorem






are both strictly negative, we can establish that the graphs of Ωi form









1−i)=1for both i,t h es e t sΩi must both be nonempty. Since
∂vi
∂R1−i




1−i)=1 ,then φvi (R
∗
i,0) > 1.S i n c eφvi (L,0) = 0,t h e r ee x i s t sa nR
0
i ≥ 0 such that (R
0
i,0) ∈ Ωi by continuity. Hence,
The graph of Ωi intersects the Ri axis.
Next, deﬁne R
00
1−i > 0 as the value of R1−i such that φvi (0,R
00
1−i)=1 . If no such value exists, I adopt the
convention that R
00




1. The statement follows trivially if R
00
1 = ∞.I fR
00
1 < ∞,I
argue that φv1 (R
00
1,0) > 1. For suppose not, i.e. suppose φv1 (R
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1)=1 ,i tf o l l o w st h a t
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1,L) such that φv1 (R
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1 ,0) = 1,f r o m
which it follows that (0,R
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1) 6=( 0 ,0) by assumption,
∂vi
∂Ri
< 0 implies φv0 (0,0) > 1,
a contradiction. Hence, φv1 (R
00
1,0) > 1=φv1 (R
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1). Recall that for any admissible (R0,R 1) where R0 is deﬁned
as ξR1 +( 1− ξ)L for some ξ ≥ 0, the proof of Proposition 2 above implies that v1 (R1,R 0) >v 0 (R0,R 1) if and
only if 1−ξ>h(ξ), which from Lemma 1 holds if and only if ξ<ξ























































,t h ed e r i v a t i v e
of 1 − ξ − h(ξ) with respect to ξ would be equal to 0 at ξ = ξ
∗, which is contradicted by the proof of Lemma 1












































       
φv0=1










With these observations, I can ﬁnally establish that there exists no other equilibrium
 
  Ri,   R1−i
 
in which
  Ri =0for some i ∈ {0,1} and φvi
 
0,   R1−i
 
< 1. This is because if such an equilibrium existed, by deﬁnition itmust be true that φvi
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≤ 1.S i n c eφvi (0,R
00





1−i. But since R1−i >R
0
1−i,i tf o l l o w st h a tφv1−i (R1−i,0) < 1. For this to be an equilibrium,   R1−i =0 .B u t








1−i)=1 , it follows that φvi (0,0) > 1, a contradiction.












1)=1 . We need to establish
that there still exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. Suppose ﬁrst that φv0 (0,0) ≤ 1. Then for any
(R0,R 1) ≥ (0,0) where (R0,R 1) 6=( 0 ,0),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tφv0 (R0,R 1) < 1.T h i si m p l i e sR0 =0in any
equilibrium, and since R0 ≥ R1 in any equilibrium according to Proposition 2, R0 = R1 =0must be the unique
equilibrium. If we rewrite R0 as ξR1 +( 1− ξ)L,t h e nξ =1>ξ
∗. But recall from Lemma 1 that this implies
v1 (0,0) <v 0 (0,0).S i n c eφv0 (0,0) ≤ 1, it follows that (0,0) is in fact an equilibrium.













(ii) φv0 (0,0) > 1. By continuity, there exists an R
0
0 <Lsuch that φv0 (R
0
0,0) = 1.T h e n I c l a i m (R0,R 1)=
(R
0
0,0) is the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. Consider again two cases. First, suppose that φv1 (0,0) ≤ 1.
In that case, monotonicity implies φv1 (0,R
0
0) < 1 given that R
0
0 > 0,s ot h a tφv1 (0,R
0
0) ≤ 1 and (R
0
0,0) is
indeed an equilibrium. Moreover, since φv1 (0,0) ≤ 1,t h e nR1 =0in any equilibrium, and it follows that (R
0
0,0)
is the unique equilibrium. Lastly, suppose φv1 (0,0) > 1. Once again, deﬁne R
00
0 such that φv0 (0,R
00
0)=1 ,
with the convention of setting R
00




0,w h i c hi n s u r e s
φv1 (0,R
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0,t h e nb yc o n t i n u i t yΩ0 and Ω1 must intersect, which contradicts the supposition that




1). Hence, φv1 (0,R
0
0) ≤ 1,s ot h a t(R
0
0,0) is an equilibrium, and since R1 =0in
any equilibrium, which insures the equilibrium above is unique.¥




























Diﬀerentiate left hand side yields
To establish the existence and uniqueness of R
∗,d e ﬁne yi = L−Ri. Using the assumption that Ri <Limplies
yi 6=0 , we can rearrange the condition v0 (R,R)=v1 (R,R) by dividing both sides by y
α and expanding out







(λ − 1)(1 − α)
(1 − (1 − α)lnλ)φy =
λ(ω(L)+µ)
(λ − 1)(1 − α)
(5.4)
The LHS of this equation is monotonically increasing in y,a n dr a n g e sf r o m0 to ∞ as y ranges from 0 to ∞.
Since the RHS above is strictly positive, there exists a unique value y
∗ for which the equation is satisﬁed. This
translates into a unique value R
∗ = L − y
∗.
Note that y
∗ is monotonically increasing in F. Taking limits, y
∗ → 0 as F → 0, while y
∗ → L+
ρ +2 µ
(1 − (1 − α)lnλ)φ
as F →∞ ,a tw h i c hp o i n tω (L − y
∗)=−µ.I fw ee v a l u a t evi (R
∗,R
∗) and substitute in from (5.4), we obtainvi =( λ − 1)
 






(ω(L − y)+µ)λF (y
∗)
α
(λ − 1)(1 − α)Zi
ω2 (L − y∗
F) − µ2
=( λ − 1)
 















ω (L − y∗)+µ
Hence, vi (R
∗,R
∗) is monotonically increasing in y
∗, which in turn is monotonically increasing in F.A sn o t e d





(1 − (1 − α)lnλ)φ
 
, which implies vi ranges between 0 and ∞.
The existence of F
∗ follows from continuity. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : Consider a ﬁxed value F>F
∗,w h e r eF
∗ is deﬁn e di nL e m m a2 .A si nt h ep r o o f
of Lemma 2, it will be useful to work with yi = L − Ri. Consider the set
S = {(y0,y 1) | v0 (L − y0,L− y1)=v1 (L − y1,L− y0)}
T h ep r o p o s i t i o nf o l l o w si fIc a ns h o wt h a tw i t h i nt h i ss e tt h e r ee x i s t sa ne l e m e n t(y0,y 1) ∈ S such that y0 >y 1
and φvi (L − yi,L− y1−i)=1for i ∈ {0,1}.
Consider ﬁrst the case where y1 =0 . For this value, we have
v0 =






ω (L − y0)ω (L) − µ2
v1 =0
Hence, there are exactly two values of y0 for which v0 (L − y0,L)=v1 (L,L − y0),n a m e l yy0 =0and
y0 =   y0 ≡
 
(ω(L)+µ)λF
ω(L)(λ − 1)(1 − α)Z0
  1
1−α
By the implicit function theorem, there exist continuous functions y0 (·) deﬁn e di nan e i g h b o r h o o do fy1 =0such
that y0 (y1) → 0 and y0 (y1) →   y0 as y1 → 0 which satisfy v0 (L − y0 (y1),L− y1)=v0 (L − y1,L− y0 (y1)).
For y1 6=0 ,w ec a nr e w r i t et h ee q u a t i o nv0 = v1 in terms of y1 and ξ =
y0
y1
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For notational convenience, I will rewrite (5.5) more compactly as
Q(ξ;y1)=0
The implicit functions y0 (y1) described above which limit to 0 and   y0 establish the existence of functions ξ (y1)






and ξ = ∞, respectively, as y1 → 0.
Deﬁne y





00 (ξ)+α(1 − α)
λFξ
α−2




Substituting in for h























































2 > 0 for some y
0




2 > 0 for all y1 ≤ y
0
1.
For y1 = y



































Hence, for all y1 ≤ y
∗, Q(ξ;y1) is convex in ξ. This will prove important in what follows.




1) to denote the case in which there exists a
continuous mapping y1 (τ) > 0 and a continuous mapping y0 (τ) deﬁned for τ ∈ (0,1) such that
1. lim
















y (τ)=∞ denotes, as usual, that for every N>0,t h e r ee x i s t saτN such that y(τ) >N
for all τ>τ N. Thus, we can describe a path in which y
0
i = ∞ for some i. N o t et h a ti fw ec a ne s t a b -
lish that (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (  y0,0), the statement of the proposition follows from a simple continuity argument: sinceφv0 (L − y
∗,L− y
∗) > 1 for F>F
∗ but φv0 (  y0,0) = 0, there exists some τ for which (y0 (τ),y 1 (τ)) ∈ S and
where φvi (L − yi (τ),L− y1−i (τ)) = 1.S i n c e v0 (L − y,L− y)=v1 (L − y,L− y) if and only if y = y
∗,a n d
since   y0 > 0, it follows that y0 (τ) >y 1 (τ) by continuity.
I now break down my analysis into diﬀerent cases, depending on the sign of
∂Q
∂ξ
evaluated at ξ =1and
y1 = y
∗. For convenience, a graphical view of the set S corresponding to each of the three cases (for particular






I claim this is enough to establish that (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (  y0,0), which from above is enough to establish the
proposition. I ﬁrst argue that there exists a y
0
1 ∈ [0,y
















> 0 for all y1, it follows that Q(1;y1) < 0 for all y1 <y
∗.F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e
Q(ξ;y
∗) is convex in ξ,i ta l s of o l l o w st h a tQ(ξ;y
∗) > 0 for all ξ>1. By continuity, then, the assumption that
(y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã (∞,y 1) for all y1 ∈ (0,y
∗) implies that for each y1 ∈ (0,y
∗) there must exist some ξ (y1) > 1 such
that Q(ξ (y1);y1) > 0. Applying the intermediate value theorem, we can deduce that for every y1 ∈ (0,y
∗) there
exists a ξ
∗ (y1) > 1 such that Q(ξ
∗ (y1);y1)=0 .S i n c eQ is continuous and convex in ξ for all y1 ≤ y
∗,t h er o o t
ξ
∗ (y1) is the unique value of ξ>1 such that Q(ξ






∗ (y1),y 1).T a k i n gt h el i m i ta sy1 ↓ 0, it follows that (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (  y0,0),s i n c et h eu n i q u er o o t
g r e a t e rt h a no n ef o rw h i c h lim












= ∞,w h i c h









Q(ξ;0)=0, it follows that (y
∗,y







∗) is strictly convex, it follows that Q(ξ;y
∗) > 0 for all ξ 6=1 .T h e f a c t t h a t (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (  y0,0)






In this case, the arguments above can no longer be used to establish that (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (  y0,0). However, I argue
that if (y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã (  y0,0), then there exists some y1 > 0 such that (y
∗,y





any such connecting path. As I argue below, this condition is also suﬃcient to establish the proposition.
Again, the proof is by contradiction. Suppose the claim is false, i.e. suppose (y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã (  y0,0) and (y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã










where the last inequality follows from the fact that
∂Q(1;y1)
∂y1
> 0 for all y1.H e n c e , i f (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (y0,y 1) for
some y0 >y
∗, it follows from continuity and the uniqueness of y
∗ that y0 >y 1.N e x t ,s i n c e(y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã (∞,y 1)for all y1 (including y1 = ∞) by assumption, it follows that
y =s u p{y0 | (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (y0,y 1) for some y1}
is ﬁnite. It follows that for any y0 >y
∗,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t(y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã (y0,y 1) if y1 ≥ y.T h u s , a n y
continuous path that originates at (y
∗,y
∗) for which y0 (τ) >y
∗ is bounded in its y1 term from above by y.
But the fact that limy1→0 Q(ξ;y1) < 0 for all ﬁnite ξ>0, together with continuity and the uniqueness of y
∗,
implies that this occurs only if (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (y0,y 1) for some y0 >y




= ∞.S i n c e
y0 (τ) ≤ y for all τ, this requires that lim
τ→1
y1 (τ)=0 . But this contradicts the fact that (y
∗,y
∗) 6Ã (  y0,0).I t
follows that either (y
∗,y
∗) Ã (  y0,0) or (y
∗,y




> 1 along this path.
The ﬁn a ls t e pi st op r o v et h a tt h ef a c tt h a t(y
∗,y




> 1 implies there exists a
solution (y0,y 1) with y0 >y 1 such that φv0 (L − y0,L− y1)=φv1 (L − y1,L− y0)=1 . Consider
lim












(ω (L − y1−i)+µ)λF






ω (L − yi)ω (L − y1−i) − µ2
As yi →∞ , the numerator converges to ±∞, depending on the sign of ω (L − y1−i), and since ω(L − yi) →− ∞ ,
the denominator converges to ±∞, again depending on the sign of ω(L − y1−i). Applying L’Hopital’s rule, we
obtain
lim
yi→∞vi (L − yi,L− y1−i)=−
(λ − 1)ω(L − y1−i)
ω0 (·)ω(L − y1−i)
< 0
Hence, since v0 (L − y0,L− y1) < 0 as y0 →∞ , it follows by continuity that there exists a pair (y0,y 1) such






> 1, it follows that y0 (τ) >y 1 (τ) by continuity.




are possible, depending on parameter values. In cases II and III, there will be
multiple solutions to the problem φvi (Ri,R 1−i)=1 , i.e. in addition to the solution identiﬁed above, there also
exists a second solution with R0 >R 1. However, the existence of multiple solutions does not necessarily imply
multiple equilibria, since these solutions may involve negative values of Ri. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :G i v e nt h a tﬁrms maximize expected proﬁts, a ﬁrm that has successfully innovated









Suppose the solution in Proposition 4 is an equilibrium. The Proposition follows if we can show that s =0 .
Clearly, if zt+s = zt, there is no beneﬁt from delay, since vt+s = vt and so in the best case scenario the ﬁrm
becomes the leader and earns vt discounted at a positive rate. Thus, given other agents are implementing
immediately and innovating in accordance with Proposition 4, a ﬁrm will only delay implementation until a


















vassuming the ﬁrm is the leading producer when it implements. Since R1 >R 0, it follows that this is less than v.
Thus, there is no reason to delay an innovation uncovered when productivity is high. Conversely, there will be















< 1. Moreover, by continuity, the solution (R0,R 1) identiﬁed in Proposition 4 limits
to (R
∗,R
∗) as F → F
∗.T h u s ,t h e r ew i l lb en ob e n e ﬁt from delay even though R1 >R 0 for F close to F
∗.Figure 1
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Growth in R&D Measures vs. Growth in Real GDP
(Shaded regions denote NBER recessions)Figure 2
Source: National Science Foundation and S&P's Compustat database
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Growth in R&D in Relatively Unconstrained Firms
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Optimal R&D as a function of capital ratio k
Equilibrium R&D as a function of capital ratio k

















































































Figure A2: Uniqueness of Markov-Perfect Equilibrium 
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v1 = f1(v0) 
v0 = f0(v1) 
v1   v0  
(v0, v1 )  * *
45°
W0 º { (R0, R1) | fv0(R0, R1) = 1} 
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Panel (A) corresponds to Case I in proof of Proposition 4 
Panel (B) corresponds to Case II in proof of Proposition 4 
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